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The theory of disparate impact, despite its reaffirmation in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991,1 has fallen into an inauspicious state of uncertainty. The landmark 
decision in Washington v. Davis called into question the doctrine’s constitution-
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der Ven, Ethan Wong, Brian Highsmith, and the entire staff of the Yale Law & 
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remiss if I did not thank my parents, who instilled in me a passion for justice.  
 1. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
666 (2001) (“While a majority of the Supreme Court is perhaps inclined toward a 
somewhat narrower conception of disparate impact liability, Congress has made 
clear its preference, which, in this area of statutory law, is of course controlling.”). 
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al legitimacy, and, ever since, disparate impact has become increasingly difficult 
to reconcile with conservative equal protection jurisprudence.2 Specifically, the 
theory underlying disparate impact—preventing facially neutral practices from 
perpetuating adverse effects on protected classes—conflicts with an under-
standing of equal protection as “more individualistic, more formal, and less 
concerned with history and social structure.”3 But the theory underlying dispar-
ate impact focuses on discriminatory effect, as opposed to intent, which neces-
sarily entails recognition of hierarchal structures of inequality. Disparate impact 
transcends discrete instances of discrimination in its larger aim to achieve inte-
gration. The legal controversy stems, in part, from this ambitious and affirma-
tive scope. 
To make matters worse, the doctrine’s efficacy appears outmoded. While 
disparate impact under Title VII remains an operative method of recourse for 
employment discrimination, hiring cases are rarely litigated.4 Perhaps this is a 
result of a problematic evidentiary framework.5 The prima facie requirements 
 2. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (declining to read the disparate 
impact theory of harm into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). See also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be 
waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on 
what terms—to make peace between them.”). Scalia’s forewarning, however, has 
not exactly come to pass. In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs 
v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., for example, the Court held that disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 
(2015). But the Court also imposed limitations at the pleading stage to prevent 
abusive claims, noting that lower courts should “avoid interpreting disparate-
impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every 
housing decision.” Id. at 2524. The Court’s analysis trends toward a more 
defendant-friendly standard, bringing it in line with Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which, as I will argue, rests on questionable theoretical 
grounds. 
 3. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 493, 498 (2003).  
 4. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate 
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1497 (1996).  
 5. The disparate impact evidentiary framework consists of three prongs. First, the 
plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination, requiring that the plaintiff establish that (1) the plaintiff is a 
member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job 
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite possessing the requisite 
qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) after rejection, the position 
remained open, and the employer continued to seek applicants or hired someone 
outside the protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973). Second, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
defendant may rebut the inference of discrimination by showing that “the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. 
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for demonstrating a statistical disparity have been heightened;6 the defendant’s 
burden of persuasion on the business necessity defense has been weakened;7 
and, practically speaking, during hiring many “adverse actions occur during the 
pre-offer period, when job candidates have little explicit knowledge of why they 
were denied an interview or job, and may, in fact, never know the true reason 
for their rejection.”8 Under the burden-shifting evidentiary framework, courts 
do not want to engage in an arbitrary interpretation of statistics, nor do they 
want to tell businesses how they should handle employment practices. Such ju-
dicial decision-making invites an ex post, ad hoc approach without clear guide-
lines on culturally contested matters of race and social status. Courts unwilling 
to make these decisions find an escape in disparate impact’s malleable doctrine. 
A timely and consequential manifestation of this legal attrition occurs when 
employers discriminate on the basis of criminal history. The tough-on-crime, 
“broken windows” approach to criminal justice has disproportionately impact-
ed marginalized communities.9 Blacks, for example, “constitute approximately 
13% of the U.S. population but account for 28% of arrestees and 45% of persons 
convicted of crime.”10 Employers then use readily accessible criminal records of 
these arrests and convictions to screen out ex-offender applicants.11 Exclusion-
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (analyzing the employer’s burden of 
production in the disparate treatment context). Third, if the defendant 
successfully rebuts the inference of discrimination, then the plaintiff may still 
prevail by demonstrating an “alternative employment practice” that has a less 
severe disparate impact while still fulfilling the employer’s legitimate business 
necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 6. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 4, at 1492.  
 7. See Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of 
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
315, 319 (1998).  
 8. Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and 
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 926 (2014). 
 9. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 6 (2001) (“The broken windows theory, aggressive 
misdemeanor arrests, and intensive stops and frisks have become not a substitute 
but a supplement—a supplement that feeds into and itself produces a dramatic 
increase in detentions, arrests, and criminal records. What we are left with today is 
a system of severe punishments for major offenders and severe treatment for 
minor offenders and ordinary citizens, especially minorities, a double-barreled 
approach with significant effects on large numbers of our citizenry.”).  
 10. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 285 (2015).  
 11. Approximately 73% of employers conduct criminal background checks on all job 
candidates. See PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., 
BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES 
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ary hiring policies reinforce existing inequalities in the labor market, which, in 
turn, exacerbate the difficulty of reintegration into society. An estimated 55% of 
young black ex-offenders are unemployed in any given week,12 and employment 
losses due to criminal records cost the economy a staggering $57 billion to $65 
billion per year.13 Considering the more than 600,000 offenders released each 
year and the countless others still under supervised release, an ex-offender un-
derclass greatly affects the U.S. labor market.14 Both the sheer magnitude and 
the racially disproportionate effects of these costs warrant reconsideration of 
disparate impact liability—the purpose of which is to remove functional inequi-
ty. In the past, ex-offenders have encountered limited success in pursuing dis-
parate impact claims against exclusionary hiring practices.15 
I posit that disparate impact’s futility can be attributed to the current state 
of the business necessity defense. I do not deny that heightened pleading re-
quirements also pose problems for meritorious claims, but that discussion is 
beyond the scope of this Note. In originally endorsing disparate impact under 
Title VII, the Supreme Court offered a simple explanation of the defendant’s 
burden: “The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, 
the practice is prohibited.” 16 But, over time, the courts have failed to expound a 
consistent interpretation of business necessity,17 a problem exacerbated by 
 12. This statistic is dated, coming from a well-known 1979 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth. There is unfortunately a paucity of data on this subject. See 
HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., URBAN INST., EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS FACING EX-
OFFENDERS 3 (2003), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410855_holzer.pdf.  
 13. See JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, EX-
OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 14 (Nov. 2010), http://www.cepr.net/ 
documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf.  
 14. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PRISONERS IN 2013, at 10 (Sept. 
2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.  
 15. See, e.g., Green v. Mo. P.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
employment discrimination on the basis of prior convictions constituted racial 
discrimination in violation of Title VII); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 
401, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (finding disparate impact liability because a company’s 
exclusionary hiring policy based on arrest records was not justified by business 
necessity), aff’d, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 941 
F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2013). It is important to note, however, that Title 
VII does not prohibit employment discrimination on account of criminal history 
per se. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).  
 16. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added).  
 17. Compare Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 895 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (M.D. 
Fla. 1995), aff’d, 85 F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The business necessity doctrine is 
very narrow . . . . An employer does not meet its burden of establishing the job 
relatedness of a test by merely showing a rational basis for the test.”), with 
Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 593 (D.R.I. 
1996), aff’d, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate 
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“confusion over the purpose and the applicability of the doctrine”—including 
confusion over the definitional elements of business necessity.18 Congress un-
fortunately compounded the problem by codifying the doctrinal confusion in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.19 The current articulation of business necessity re-
mains unclear, and, without neutral, predictable rules for adjudication, business 
necessity inevitably devolves into a reasonableness determination on the mar-
gins. Legally, the business necessity threshold is too low: an indeterminate 
standard allows employers to escape liability by pointing to any abstract risk as-
sociated with hiring an ex-offender. Considering the difficulty of statistically 
showing a prima facie case of disparate impact, the addition of a weakened 
business necessity risks under-inclusivity—giving courts, already hostile to em-
ployment cases, far too much subjective leeway to dispose of valid claims. Doc-
trinally, an artificially low burden of persuasion collapses into disparate treat-
ment’s defensive burden of production, obscuring culpability distinctions under 
Title VII.20 And, conceptually, the current business necessity defense is funda-
that “the challenged practice is reasonably necessary to achieve an important 
business objective”). See also discussion infra Part II.A.  
 18. Lye, supra note 7, at 319.  
 19. Since the deliberations proved contentious, Congress stipulated that courts could 
not consider any document other than an interpretive memorandum for 
legislative history purposes. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166,  
§ 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) 
(2012)). This interpretive memorandum is unhelpful and nearly tautological, 
declaring that “[t]he terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are intended to 
reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed. 2d 158 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 
2115, 104 L.Ed. 2d 733 (1989).” 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). The 
disparate impact implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have been a source of 
scholarly debate. Compare Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the 
New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1157 (1993) (arguing that Wards Cove is 
still good law) with Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity 
Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 896, 910-13 (1993) (contending that Wards Cove is no 
longer controlling).  
 20. See Lye, supra note 7, at 348 n.168 (listing cases in which courts conflate disparate 
impact with disparate treatment). While the distinction between disparate impact 
and treatment has never been clear, the application of the burdens of proof is 
supposed to be different. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“In a disparate-treatment case there is no ‘discrimination’ within the meaning of 
Title VII unless the employer intentionally treated the employee unfairly because 
of race. Therefore, the employee retains the burden of proving the existence of 
intent at all times. . . . In contrast, intent plays no role in the disparate-impact 
inquiry. The question, rather, is whether an employment practice has a significant, 
adverse effect on an identifiable class of workers—regardless of the cause or 
motive for the practice. The employer may attempt to contradict the factual basis 
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mentally at odds with the purpose of disparate impact doctrine. The watered-
down standard indulges the very presumption that disparate impact is meant to 
counter: that artificial barriers in the labor market may reinforce systemic dis-
criminatory effects. 
Rather than admit defeat on disparate impact, as some scholars have sug-
gested,21 I am reluctant to abandon the existing framework without first at-
tempting to advance a proper understanding of the doctrine. Even if the practi-
cal efficacy of the doctrine remains dubious, “law’s symbolic or expressive 
functions are sometimes more important than its immediate practical conse-
quences,” according to Professor Richard Primus, “and the story we tell about 
disparate impact doctrine still plays a significant role in shaping how we think 
about the nature and purposes of antidiscrimination law.”22 Indeed, disparate 
impact conveys a powerful social meaning: discrimination is less about subjec-
tive intentions and more about the objective status of historically disadvantaged 
populations. This “more robust” conception of disparate impact is precisely 
what needs to be sustained in the face of a less amenable antidiscrimination 
canon.23 Perhaps now more than ever, disparate impact’s contemplation of sys-
temic effects is needed to ensure equality of opportunity in today’s society—a 
society that often overlooks enduring yet less perceptible discrimination in its 
desire to become post-racial. 
But here this Note departs from the prevailing disparate impact literature. 
This Note is less about the idea of disparate impact writ large—which has been 
overwritten for a relatively narrow issue of law24—and more about an analytic 
construct that offers a novel contribution to antidiscrimination scholarship. 
This Note looks to reconceptualize disparate impact’s doctrinal framework by 
extrapolating from the Third Circuit’s notion of “risk management” as an in-
 21. See Paul-Emile, supra note 8, at 935 (arguing that the disparate impact doctrine 
should be replaced with the health law framework embodied by the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, which 
regulates “the flow of information that may form the basis of an adverse 
employment decision in order to preemptively prevent discrimination, while 
ensuring equality of opportunity”). This would require a statutory reform; 
legislative approbation is, of course, unlikely given the current political 
environment. See also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 767-82 (2006) (contending that disparate impact theory was 
premised on the mistaken belief that a legal doctrine could achieve politically 
contested forms of integration and affirmative action).  
 22. Primus, supra note 3, at 499.  
 23. Id.  
 24. In a similar vein, affirmative action, which is often closely associated with 
disparate impact theory, suffers from the same criticism. See Jim Chen, Diversity in 
a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action’s Destiny, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 813 (1998) (characterizing affirmative action as one of the most 
oversaturated areas of legal scholarship). 
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terpretation of business necessity.25 I define risk management as a conceptual 
model or procedure in which institutions must determine whether the benefits 
of hiring an ex-offender are reasonably proportional to the costs. This method 
is broader than traditional cost-benefit analysis and contemplates an evaluation 
of competing interests by the factfinder. Risk management provides a workable 
heuristic for measuring exclusionary hiring practices against ex-offenders and, 
quite possibly, a solution to the indeterminacy of disparate impact’s malleable 
doctrine. 
Risk management differs from the current articulation of business necessity 
in two crucial ways. First, risk management offers a systematic, process-based 
method for adjudicating cases under Title VII. The concept lays out neutral cri-
teria for empirically testing whether a challenged employment practice is suffi-
ciently related to business necessity or is a mere pretext for discrimination. Sec-
ond, risk management reconciles the tension underlying business necessity, 
striking a compromise between the “balancing” of “competing social and en-
trepreneurial interests” and “forc[ing] us, and the courts, to recognize the 
stakes of the decision.”26 The concept attempts a reconciliation of these inter-
ests—all while the process itself remains apathetic to the political undertones 
surrounding disparate impact. The truth is that imposing disparate impact lia-
bility represents a Calabresian tragic choice of sorts—between the economic 
risks associated with hiring an ex-offender and the moral value our society plac-
es on fair opportunity in the labor market.27 Risk management does not care 
about society’s response to this tragic choice; rather, it cares about how we ar-
rive at that response. Indeed, getting the procedure right may at least mean 
minimizing the conflict inherent in tragic choices.28 Ultimately, risk manage-
ment moves us away from a problematic doctrine and towards a more robust 
procedure that seeks an optimal level of liability through a clear, bright-line 
standard. A more robust procedural framework will, in turn, properly comple-
ment the substantive, remedial objectives of Title VII. 
This Note proceeds in two Parts. First, I lay out a working model of risk 
management, which would require employers to think more carefully about 
criminal recidivism and approximate the costs and benefits of employing an ex-
offender. Second, I develop a legal justification. Risk management, as I argue, 
accords with a proper doctrinal understanding of disparate impact, consistent 
with controlling precedent and antidiscrimination law. Taken together, the ar-
 25. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 26. Lye, supra note 7, at 358.  
 27. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).  
 28. As an analogue, the concept of deterrence in criminal law arguably provides 
neutral justifications for outcomes and, in doing so, sanitizes “incessant illiberal 
conflict over” deeply-entrenched values by displacing expressive moralizing in the 
law. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
416 (1999). My hope is that risk management may be a way to avoid cognitive 
illiberalism in enforcing civil rights.  
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gument counsels a higher threshold for business necessity in the hopes of re-
ducing the stigma of a criminal history and, ultimately, improving fair oppor-
tunity in the labor market. 
 
I. Defining Risk Management: Procedural and Normative Dimen-
sions 
 
This Part sketches what a functional policy of risk management should look 
like. I first offer an instructive case study to analyze the practice of risk man-
agement through the lens of cost-benefit analysis. I then offer some theoretical 
notes to distinguish risk management from traditional cost-benefit analysis. It is 
important to note that cost-benefit analysis does not underpin risk manage-
ment as a matter of law, nor is it necessarily normative for the purposes of eval-
uating business necessity. I merely use cost-benefit analysis to illustrate a broad-
er point about how risk management makes use of an empirical proportionality 
analysis. Finally, I briefly turn to the normative dimension of risk management, 
addressing a very important question: whose judgments should control for the 
purposes of risk management? This discussion is also not meant to be exhaus-
tive or dispositive; rather, it is only a starting point to better understand busi-
ness necessity as risk management. 
 
A. El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority: A Case 
Study 
 
The Third Circuit’s decision in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority provides an illustrative example of disparate impact’s problemat-
ic doctrine. Douglas El, a black paratransit driver, brought suit alleging a viola-
tion of Title VII after Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA) terminated him upon discovery of his forty-year old second-degree 
homicide conviction.29 Notably, El, who was fifteen at the time of this gang-
related homicide, had only served three-and-a-half years, and the court inti-
mated that he might not have been the triggerman.30 After El demonstrated a 
prima facie case of discrimination, the Third Circuit interpreted the business 
necessity defense to require that “the policy under review accurately distinguish 
between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that do 
not.”31 Challenged hiring practices, in other words, “ultimately concern the 
management of risk.”32 This novel idea of business necessity as risk manage-
ment begs further analysis. Curiously, however, the court rather summarily dis-
posed of the plaintiff’s claim and affirmed summary judgment for SEPTA. 
 29. El, 479 F.3d at 232, 235-36.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).  
 32. Id. at 244.  
506 
 
Struebing FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2016 2:47 PM 
RECONSIDERING DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER TITLE VII  
The El decision has received an inordinate amount of attention in the liter-
ature—which is troubling, given its procedural disposition and many factual 
quirks.33 The El court, in particular, intimated bad lawyering, questioning why 
the plaintiffs failed to refute SEPTA’s business necessity.34 The case is an unfor-
tunate vehicle, which helps to explain why the court, perhaps inadvertently, did 
not hold the defendant to its burden of persuasion. The end result more closely 
tracks disparate treatment’s defensive burden of production, which entails a 
perfunctory showing of an employer’s legitimate reason for an adverse em-
ployment decision. SEPTA merely points to a general risk of recidivism to justi-
fy its policy of categorically excluding ex-offenders convicted of violent crimes. 
Although the plaintiff could still have shown a less injurious alternative, no one 
at SEPTA could advance a tailored, let alone coherent, policy rationale.35 This is 
where the concept of risk management comes into play. 
As a preliminary matter, I propose the following definition of risk man-
agement: a procedure in which institutions analyze (preferably ex ante) whether 
the benefits of hiring an ex-offender are reasonably proportional to the costs. 
This definition provides a benchmark for determining acceptable levels of risk 
and, as I will argue, is derived from existing antidiscrimination law.36 On one 
hand, the proportionality component represents a process in which employers 
must think carefully about the qualitative and quantitative aspects of accom-
modating an ex-offender’s risk. Employers should tailor a discriminatory hiring 
practice to a job-related risk, making sure to proportionally weigh the costs and 
benefits of accommodating that risk. Recidivism rates, the amount of time 
passed since an arrest or conviction, the nature of the underlying offense, and 
 33. See, e.g, JACOBS, supra note 10, at 277; STEVEN RAPHAEL, THE NEW SCARLET LETTER?: 
NEGOTIATING THE U.S. LABOR MARKET WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD 51 (2014); Shawn 
D. Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and 
Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 30-31 (2011); 
Timothy M. Cary, A Checkered Past: When Title VII Collides With State Statutes 
Mandating Criminal Background Checks, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 499, 503-05 
(2013); Terence G. Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and 
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 
SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 987-88 (2013); Johnathan A. Smith, Banning the Box But 
Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on 
Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 209-10 (2014); Tiffany 
R. Nichols, Note, Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire?: The Cloud of Suspicion 
Surrounding Former Offenders and the EEOC’s New Enforcement Guidance on 
Criminal Records Under Title VII, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 602-04 (2013).  
 34. El, 479 F.3d at 247.  
 35. With ill-defined business necessity, it might become more difficult for the plaintiff 
to demonstrate and validate the third prong of disparate impact’s burden-shifting 
framework, a less injurious alternative. See Anita M. Alessandra, Comment, When 
Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1783-84 (1989).  
 36. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.  
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the type of job sought should inform this calculus. Assuming that a rough pro-
portionality is met, the question then becomes whether the benefits and costs of 
hiring an ex-offender are reasonable in a case-specific context, which, in turn, 
depends on a deliberative process that accounts for a community’s norms and 
expectations. This is where the reasonableness component of risk management 
comes in, allowing juries to settle factual disputes and, in doing so, to balance 
empirical findings with expressive considerations of risk and equity. With these 
procedural and normative dimensions of risk management, we now have a 
rough conceptual framework in place. 
How, then, would risk management apply when employers discriminate on 
the basis of criminal history? Since employers are often concerned with tort lia-
bility for negligent hiring or retention, they should have the burden of devising 
a carefully tailored hiring policy when the cost of doing so is less than the cost 
of liability, discounted by the probability of an ex-offender recidivating. In this 
sense, employers may be the least cost avoider in a larger scheme to optimally 
deter risky negligence.37 Employers are best able bear the costs of an employee’s 
risk up to the point at which the cost of accommodation is greater than the cost 
of negligence. When the accommodative costs associated with hiring an ex-
offender become unreasonably high in this assessment, then the employer’s 
business necessity improves welfare and is probably justified. With this under-
standing, a factfinder might then excuse disparate impact under the doctrinal 
framework of Title VII. This empirical understanding of risk management, in 
turn, supports an objective threshold for business necessity. 
Recall the fact pattern in the El case. SEPTA believed that hiring Douglas El, 
who had a forty-year-old homicide conviction, would potentially harm its vul-
nerable paratransit customers. The concern may appear reasonable at first 
glance, but a proper understanding of business necessity dictates otherwise. 
SEPTA should empirically demonstrate that Douglas El poses a significant risk, 
the costs of which foreclose accommodation. SEPTA did call expert witnesses, 
who relied on recidivism statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice that 
tracked ex-offenders for only three years.38 Referring to Douglas El, however, 
the court noted that these “statistics do not demonstrate that someone in this 
position—or anything like it—is likely to recidivate.”39 In a footnote, the court 
further challenged the empirical sufficiency of SEPTA’s flawed assessment: 
SEPTA too heavily emphasizes the sixth alleged fact: that it is impossi-
ble to predict which criminal will recidivate. This fact, if proved, is of 
little use because it is also impossible to predict which non-criminal 
will commit a crime. What matters is the risk that the individual pre-
sents, taking into account whatever aspects of the person’s criminal 
history are relevant. Thus, if screening out applicants with very old vio-
lent criminal convictions accurately distinguishes between those who 
 37. See Paul-Emile, supra note 8, at 945-46.  
 38. El, 479 F.3d at 246.  
 39. Id.  
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present an unacceptable risk, then reliance on this factor is appropriate; 
if the criterion is inaccurate or overbroad in the case of very old convic-
tions, then it is inappropriate for Title VII purposes.40 
A factfinder could arguably stop right here. SEPTA failed to accurately 
show that the particular risk of hiring Douglas El was unacceptably higher than 
hiring a non-offender. A business necessity defense that simply ignores the re-
moteness of a conviction is inappropriate under Title VII. A simple cost-benefit 
analysis, moreover, shows that SEPTA’s exclusion of ex-offenders with remote 
convictions is unjustified. It turns out that the time to redemption—the point 
at which an ex-offender’s probability of a new conviction converges or inter-
sects with a non-offender’s probability of conviction—for offenders who were 
between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one when the underlying offense oc-
curred is approximately thirteen to sixteen years.41 Since Douglas El was fifteen 
years old at the time of his conviction in 1960, he presumably reached the point 
of redemption when he applied to work at SEPTA in 2000. He therefore shared 
a baseline probability of conviction with the general population—roughly 
1.75%.42 
If we multiply this probability times the cost of something terrible happen-
ing—say, the cost of a negligent hiring suit against SEPTA following a violent 
incident on the job—the risk is monetized at approximately $28,000.43 This 
represents the cost of accommodating an ex-offender like Douglas El. Notably, 
we have no compelling reason to believe that this cost is any higher than em-
ploying a non-offender from the general population. If the factfinder can infer 
that the benefits of hiring Douglas El are reasonably proportional to $28,000, 
then SEPTA fails to justify its business necessity.44 The reasonableness compo-
 40. Id. at n.16.  
 41. Bushway et al., supra note 33, at 51. Compare Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Enduring 
Risk: Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement, 53 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 64, 80 (2007) (finding that the point of redemption for ex-
offenders occurs seven years after arrest or first contact with police), with Alfred 
Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 335, 349-50 (2009) (concluding 
that offenders arrested in New York in 1980 for robbery, burglary, or aggravated 
assault had a declining probability of recidivism with time clean).  
 42. See Bushway et al., supra note 33, at 36.  
 43. For this calculation, I approximate the average settlement cost for a negligent 
hiring suit, which is $1.6 million. See Mary L. Connerley et al., Criminal 
Background Checks for Prospective and Current Employees: Current Practices Among 
Municipal Agencies, 30 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 173, 174 (2001).  
 44. I purposely do not define the benefits of hiring an ex-offender, because it is 
ultimately up to the factfinder to determine these benefits within reason. But they 
might include increased labor productivity, tax breaks, and other intangible social 
benefits. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO THE WORK 
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nent ensures that an empirical analysis cannot ignore the intangible social bene-
fits and costs of hiring an ex-offender. On the one hand, the public may per-
ceive a danger in the employment of ex-offenders. This perception, whether ra-
tional or not, creates real-life costs when the public refrains from commercial 
activity.45 Gainful employment for ex-offenders, on the other hand, improves 
well-being, provides an immeasurable dignitary value, and reduces recidivism, 
which, in turn, decreases corrections costs.46 A factfinder is best suited to intui-
tively perform this balancing act and, in the case of Douglas El, could have im-
posed disparate impact liability, since the risk was relatively insignificant given 
the remoteness of the underlying offense and the importance of providing a 
second chance. To avoid liability, SEPTA should have tailored its exclusionary 
policy to reflect points of redemption for prospective employees with criminal 
histories. In reality, however, SEPTA used an arbitrary hiring policy to func-
tionally disadvantage Douglas El and others like him. 
Businesses may find it practically difficult to conduct and quantify these 
risk assessments. Rates of recidivism and points of redemption estimates are 
variable, not immutable characteristics of individuals.47 If business necessity re-
quires some degree of empirical validation, as I will argue, then employers 
should at the very least try to use risk management, starting with what we do 
know about recidivism. In New York State, for example, the point of redemp-
tion for an eighteen-year-old convicted of burglary is only about 3.8 years.48 The 
time to redemption increases for more violent crimes: 4.3 years for aggravated 
assault and 7.7 years for robbery.49 We also know that time to redemption is in-
versely related to the number of offenses and an ex-offender’s age.50 How 
should an employer make sense of this information? Perhaps a good starting 
point is to reform exclusionary hiring policies that adversely affect ex-offenders 
well past their point of redemption. A more exacting look into the costs and 
benefits can be used for all other ex-offenders who have not reached their point 
of redemption for a particular offense. Employers will need better criteria for 
appraising the monetary costs and benefits of accommodating ex-offenders. 
 45. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 171 
(2014) (discussing the costs of societal fears under the cost-benefit approach). 
 46. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE 
REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 26 (Apr. 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2011/PewStateofRecidivismpdf.pdf 
(suggesting that if states could reduce recidivism rates by just 10%, they could, in 
total, save $635 million in corrections costs annually).  
 47. See Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 167, 172 (2014).  
 48. See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 41, at 339. The point of redemption is 
simply defined as the point at which “the risk of reoffending has subsided to the 
level of a reasonable comparison group.” See id. at 332. 
 49. See id.  
 50. See Bushway et al., supra note 33, at 52.  
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But, fortunately, data-driven risk management is already becoming the new 
administrative norm. 
The criminal justice system, in particular, has recently made a shift towards 
incorporating risk management into its policymaking apparatus.51 Reconciling 
the public interest in safety, rehabilitation, and an efficient expenditure of re-
sources is the new paradigm, and “[t]he ideology of risk is now considered at 
the heart of such a balancing act. Information about a defendant’s risk of recid-
ivism informs an expanding number and variety of criminal justice decisions.”52 
The Federal Post-Conviction Risk Assessment, for example, uses algorithmic 
scoring of a variety of factors—including employment, education, substance 
abuse history, and family status—to better inform policies for ex-offenders on 
supervised release.53 The move towards data-driven policies creates the unex-
plored possibility for institutions like the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to distribute information on criminal risk to large em-
ployers. Better data systems will help employers tailor exclusionary policies 
against ex-offenders in proportion to their individual risk. The more sufficient 
and reliable the data, the more weight a factfinder should be entitled to give to a 
business necessity. In an era of excessive criminalization, risk management can 
be used to define what constitutes an actual business necessity. When no busi-
ness necessity exists, we can remove the stigma of a criminal record, achieving 
equitable opportunities in the labor market. 
 
B. Distinguishing Risk Management From Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Despite the possibility for better assessment, risk management does not 
countenance a traditional, welfare-maximizing cost-benefit analysis. The Third 
Circuit only requires hiring policies that “accurately distinguish between appli-
cants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that do not,” implying 
the kind of rough proportionality analysis found in Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) cases.54 But examining business necessity through the theoretical 
lens of cost-benefit analysis will prove to be a valuable exercise, elucidating the 
larger issues at stake. 
Cost-benefit analysis is often the prevailing norm in risk management. In 
managing tort and environmental risk, for example, cost-benefit analysis seeks 
economic efficiency—the point at which the marginal cost of a particular risk 
 51. See Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal History on Risk 
Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 88 (2015) (“The contemporary approach 
seeks to achieve multiple goals: manage costs and resources, constrain 
overdependence on imprisonment, utilize effective alternative rehabilitative 
programming, reduce recidivism risk, and simultaneously improve public 
safety.”).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 94. 
 54. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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regulation is equal to its marginal benefit. Cost-benefit analysis is considered 
desirable for its consistency, transparency, and procedural fairness. By treating 
all cases alike, it eliminates arbitrary differences in outcomes that stem, in part, 
from our own cognitive biases in measuring risk. In fact, the public’s perception 
of risk often differs from that of the scientific community. Despite the infinites-
imal chance of harm, the public, for example, fears nuclear power because the 
health risk is “involuntarily suffered, new, unobservable, uncontrollable, cata-
strophic, delayed, a threat to future generations, or likely accompanied by pain 
or dread.”55 In other words, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes astutely observed, 
“most people think dramatically, not quantitatively.”56 Thus, the public’s de-
mand for regulation may be irrational from a utilitarian perspective. Such irra-
tionality counsels against institutionalizing public misperceptions for a very 
simple reason: society can improve more lives in the aggregate by investing in 
cost-effective regulations.57 Risk management should therefore prioritize the 
most potent dangers by assessing the severity and frequency of risk. 
By definition, however, risk management goes beyond traditional cost-
benefit analysis based exclusively on monetary quantification. In evaluating 
whether the benefits of hiring an ex-offender are proportional to the risk, the 
concept constitutes an informational monitoring tool for employers engaging 
in risk-based discrimination. Rather than setting a welfare-maximizing bench-
mark, the goal is to have a consistent and transparent process in which employ-
ers can make a well-reasoned hiring decision. In this sense, risk management 
closely incorporates the more holistic cost-benefit approach in regulatory 
law58—encompassing both qualitative and quantitative evaluations. This ap-
 55. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 33 (1993).  
 56. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (July 
5, 1912), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN LETTERS: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 45 (David H. Burton ed., 1976), 
quoted in STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 37 (1993).  
 57. See BREYER, supra note 55, at 50 (arguing that public misperception, legislative 
overreaction, and “the uncertainties of the regulatory process” create a vicious 
cycle that undermines efficient levels of health and safety); W. KIP VISCUSI, 
RATIONAL RISK POLICY 127-28 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
843, 871 (2000).  
 58. See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 72, 72 (2009) (“The basic thrust of New 
Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis is to detach cost-benefit analysis (CBA) from 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which we argue lacks moral relevance . . . and instead to 
see CBA as a rough, administrable proxy for overall wellbeing.”) (internal citation 
omitted); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for 
Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) (“We mean to use the term in a modest, nonsectarian 
way, seeing cost-benefit analysis as a tool and a procedure, rather than as a rigid 
formula to govern outcomes. Thus understood, cost-benefit analysis requires a full 
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proach largely coheres with President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13,563, 
“Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” which authorizes each gov-
ernment agency to “consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult 
or impossible to quantify, including human dignity, fairness, and distributive 
impacts.”59 Qualitative specification is desirable because it prevents cost-benefit 
analysis from construing these intrinsic values as efficiency tradeoffs or com-
modities that can be bought and sold on the open market.60 To contemplate in-
tangible social benefits and dignitary values, Professor Cass Sunstein offers a 
useful heuristic called “breakeven analysis” in which “agencies do not quantify 
unquantified or unmonetized benefits (because they are by hypothesis unable 
to do so), but instead specify how high such benefits would have to be in order 
for the benefits to justify the costs.”61 Although this analytic process features 
prominently in regulatory policy, Sunstein acknowledges profound implica-
accounting of the consequences of an action, in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. Officials should have this accounting before them when they make 
decisions.”).  
 59. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011). This Executive Order begins to lay the 
foundation for a more democratic and less technocratic approach to cost-benefit 
analysis. Indeed, the Executive Order acknowledges as much insofar as 
“[r]egulations shall be adopted through a process that involves public 
participation” and an “open exchange of information and perspectives” amongst 
the public, affected stakeholders, and government officials. Id. (emphasis added).  
 60. See Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 
YALE L.J. 1732, 1766-70 (2014).  
 61. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions 
(and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 195 (2014). Sunstein also 
offers a real-life example in antidiscrimination law. In the context of disability 
rights, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) proposed a regulation designed to 
increase spatial wheelchair access in bathrooms. Although “the monetized costs of 
these requirements substantially exceed[ed] the monetized benefits,” DOJ 
explained its rationale for departing from the traditional regulatory cost-benefit 
analysis: “The additional benefits that persons with disabilities will derive from 
greater safety, enhanced independence, and the avoidance of stigma and 
humiliation—benefits that the Department’s economic model could not put in 
monetary terms—are, in the Department’s experience and considered judgment, 
likely to be quite high.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and 
Local Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,170 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified as 
amended at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2013)). The total monetized costs of the regulation 
exceeded the benefits by approximately $454 million, but the costs, when 
annualized and divided by the estimated 677 million annual uses, came out to be 
about 5 cents per use. The DOJ concluded that the realization of human dignity by 
millions of users was well worth the $454 million shortfall. See Sunstein, supra, at 
195 n.111.  
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tions for other areas of law where accounting matters and requires some level of 
classifying tradeoffs.62 
In the context of risk management, then, breakeven analysis can inform the 
inquiry into whether the benefits of hiring an ex-offender are proportional to 
the costs. Indeed, the calculation in the El case study above operates as a simple 
breakeven analysis. The costs of accommodating the risk could be roughly 
monetized, but the benefits—ranging from the dignitary value of successful re-
integration to increased labor productivity—could not be so readily quantified. 
The question then became whether the dignitary and distributive gains war-
ranted the accommodation. A decision maker could have easily concluded that, 
qualitatively, “the nature and gravity of the dignitary values at stake” overshad-
owed relatively minor costs.63 For the business necessity doctrine, the value 
added is increased accountability and consistency, which give decision makers a 
better idea of what sensible tradeoffs look like when tragic choices must be con-
fronted. “A great virtue of cost-benefit analysis, or a proportionality test,” ac-
cording to Sunstein, “is that it puts the resistance to its proof. It should be clear 
that a competent cost-benefit analysis calls for attention to the benefits to the 
employee, not simply to the employer, of requested accommodations.”64 By 
forcing the defense to meet its evidentiary burden, a robust proportionality 
analysis exposes “erroneous intuitions, or hostility and prejudice”65—a sort of 
cognitive illiberalism66—lurking beneath a decision to impose liability. Accord-
ingly, risk management advances a predictable, bright-line application of the 
business necessity standard. 
Risk management ultimately calls for a proportionality test—a weighing of 
the costs and benefits—informed by the principles of the new cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Thus far, I have begun a preliminary account of how risk should be regu-
lated when employers discriminate on the basis of a criminal history. But Title 
VII “does not enact . . . Kaldor and Hicks’s understanding of economic efficien-
cy.”67 Risk management, that is, presupposes that proportionality and cost-
benefit analysis are preeminent values in identifying a business necessity. The 
next step of the argument requires a justification of why risk management is de-
 62. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or 
Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1895 (2007) (assessing the role of cost-benefit analysis in the context of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act).  
 63. Bayefsky, supra note 60, at 1737.  
 64. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1906-07.  
 65. Id. at 1907.  
 66. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 
(2007) (arguing that people in a liberal democracy lack the psychological capacity 
to interpret and administer law “without indulging sensibilities pervaded by our 
attachments to highly contested visions of the good”). 
 67. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1907.  
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sirable. In the next Part, I address the normative implications of risk manage-
ment in the enforcement of civil rights. 
 
C. The Normative Dimension: Value Judgments in Risk Management 
 
The functional account of risk management suffers from a few shortcom-
ings. First, the proportionality analysis outlined above is oversimplified. The 
probability of recidivism varies greatly depending on a number of exogenous 
factors,68 and the costs of accommodation may not be limited to tort liability. 
Second, the risk management model also presupposes that the regulated risk 
will probabilistically take place. But an ex-offender may choose not to recidivate 
given better job prospects in the labor market. Risk management largely ignores 
this agency. Third, as a result of undervaluing when empirical uncertainties 
abound, risk management may be morally reproachable, insofar as it fails to re-
flect community values regarding our preferred policy goals. 
The third shortcoming, in particular, begs important questions: Whose 
judgments are normative for the purposes of risk management? Should the so-
cial values of the community control, or should scientific understanding of risk 
govern? In the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Professor 
Samuel Bagenstos calls attention to the dialectical tension between expressive 
perceptions of risk and technocratic risk regulation.69 Although risk manage-
ment may “counterbalance” cognitive bias and political subordination, there is 
no guarantee that it conforms to a community’s “value judgments.”70 Institu-
tional decision-makers adhere to social norms when expressing judgments, and 
these judgments often conflict with scientific understanding. The judgment 
comes down to the question, “Is the risk worth running? As the democrats have 
shown, that is at bottom a value question.”71 The answer may plausibly be no 
when it comes to employing ex-offenders who have previously violated a com-
munity’s trust. In response, Bagenstos stakes out a middle ground, arguing for 
“a strong rule of deference” to risk assessments when the scientific consensus 
clearly supports one party over the other.72 This compromise seems workable, 
 68. See, e.g., Julie Horney et al., Criminal Careers in the Short-Term: Intra-Individual 
Variability in Crime and Its Relation to Local Life Circumstances, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 
655, 668 (1995) (arguing that short-term changes in criminal involvement are 
strongly related to variation in local life circumstances, including substance abuse, 
living arrangements, and relationships).  
 69. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1481-82 (2001). 
 70. Id. at 1486-87.  
 71. Id. at 1496.  
 72. Id. at 1495. See also id. at 1512 (“The results of the various uses of technocracy in the 
disability-related risk context suggest that politically liberal advocates of equitable 
responses to risk are not well served by simply embracing technocratic processes 
or using them as the presumptive framework for policymaking. Nor, however, are 
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but the injection of an expressive, normative dimension into cost-benefit analy-
sis, especially when difficult decisions come down to the margin, will, at heart, 
turn on a value-laden judgment. 
Professor Douglas Kysar, perhaps the most eloquent critic of cost-benefit 
analysis, might attribute this devolution to the “perils of prediction,” meaning 
that the “tools of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis . . . inevitably leave a 
moral remainder in the form of eliminable empirical uncertainties, irresolvable 
valuation questions, and other non-technocratic issues that implicate collective 
responsibility.”73 In “crowd[ing] out other ways of conceptualizing wellbeing 
and promoting its attainment,” cost-benefit analysis loses “collective engage-
ment” with the “normative dimensions” of civil rights law.74 This is a real prob-
lem and one that must be reconciled with risk management as an objective 
threshold for the business necessity defense. I argue that risk management can 
perform this delicate balancing act as part of a dialectic—reconciling or synthe-
sizing technocratic procedure with substantive values. The proportionality 
component mandates a process in which employers must think carefully about 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of accommodating an ex-offender’s risk. 
In situations in which a selective bias against a systematically disadvantaged 
group has taken hold, the process should satisfy both advocates of cost-benefit 
analysis and a democratic approach to risk regulation. The reasonableness 
component of risk management, on the other hand, allows factfinders to ex-
pressively consider the risk of hiring an ex-offender. The normative dimension 
leaves room for moral self-awareness and preserves collective engagement with 
civil rights law, allowing contentious questions to be resolved by the political 
community. 
Consequently, the primary normative issue in making business necessity as 
risk management work is political in nature. The legitimacy of risk management 
ultimately depends on the relevant governing political and institutional systems. 
Deliberative processes should inform risk management, respecting the dignitary 
value that the community places on equality of opportunity. Admittedly, collec-
tive engagement with civil rights law is far from straightforward and continues 
to be polemical in our politics. We can also hardly consider ex-offenders, dif-
fuse and anonymous citizens reintegrating into society, as part of the governing 
political community. This casts any deliberative process underlying risk man-
agement in a precarious light. But, then again, it is precisely because ex-
they well served by rejecting technocratic tools outright. Technocratic approaches 
seem likely to serve the cause of equity when the relevant technocratic 
decisionmakers are well positioned to hear and take seriously the interests of 
disadvantaged groups, when general public attitude or imbalances of political 
power would otherwise lead to an inequitable distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of risk, and when political and legal avenues provide a check on 
inequitable actions by the technocrats themselves.”).  
 73. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE 
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 16 (2010).  
 74. Id. at 16-17.  
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offenders lack political power that judicial enforcement of Title VII should seek 
to protect a class of citizens internalizing the burden of overcriminalization and 
failed “broken windows” policies. As social mores on criminal justice change 
and the problem of mass incarceration reaches the public’s consciousness,75 
placing value on helping ex-offenders in the labor market becomes imperative. 
Risk management provides a framework to instantiate that valuation in the en-
forcement of civil rights. And we cannot forget that risk management operates 
under a superstructure rooted in equal opportunity—Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed as reflecting a foundational 
norm in American political culture.76 
 
II. The Doctrinal Compatibility of Risk Management 
 
After describing a process-based method for determining a business neces-
sity and reconciling the standard with normative values, the argument now re-
quires a legal justification. 
I argue that business necessity as risk management aligns with a proper 
doctrinal understanding of disparate impact as glossed by controlling prece-
dent. Although the disparate impact doctrine never endorsed the concept of 
risk management until the Third Circuit’s El decision, courts have sought a 
more systematic, process-based method for adjudicating cases under Title VII. 
The case law comprehends the objective rationality and objectivity that under-
lies risk management. First, I briefly summarize the relevant authority before 
contending that risk management can be derived from employment discrimina-
tion law. Second, I argue that business necessity as risk management is analyti-
cally similar to the reasonable accommodation standard of the ADA. From the 
outset, it is worth noting the nexus between disparate impact, codified in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and reasonable accommodation, codified in the ADA of 
1991, as a reaffirmation of the Second Reconstruction.77 These laws go beyond 
formal classifications, as Owen Fiss famously championed, scrutinizing “the 
subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged group.”78 
 75. Amongst calls for reform, the politics of criminal justice may be changing. See, e.g., 
Record Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment Act of 2014, S. 2567, 113th 
Cong. (2014); Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the Left and the Right: Justice 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/ 
politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-and-the-right-justice reform.html.  
 76. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 
1237 (2001).  
 77. Disparate impact has been incorporated into the ADA. See Gonzales v. City of 
New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 839 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12112(b)(3), (6) (1997)) (“Recognized as an actionable form of discrimination 
under Title VII, the disparate impact theory has been adopted entirely by the 
ADA.”).  
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A. Risk Management in Employment Discrimination Law 
 
The starting point is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,79 the canonical case that ex-
tended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to incorporate the theory of dis-
parate impact. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, defines the 
scope of Title VII: 
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from 
the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to fa-
vor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. 
Under the act, practice, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 
“freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.80 
We begin to see that disparate impact really concerns “barriers that have 
operated in the past.” To remedy the entrenchment of discriminatory effects, 
“Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment 
practices, not simply the motivation.”81 Notably, the Court in Griggs reproved 
the lower court for finding that the respondent’s past discriminatory practices 
were beyond the reach of Congress’s remedial prerogative.82 Griggs therefore 
validated disparate impact as an appropriate mechanism to enforce Title VII’s 
comprehensive scope and to rectify long-standing discriminatory barriers in 
employment. These social barriers, including inferior public education in ra-
cially segregated communities, are what “operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”83 Although the Court 
showed some ambivalence about the use of race as a proxy for an inequitable 
distribution of social functionings,84 the language of the opinion still gives sub-
stantial teeth to Title VII. Griggs’s bottom line supports equality of opportunity 
 79. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, thirteen black employees of a North Carolina power 
plant challenged their employer’s conditions for employment, including a high 
school diploma and standardized aptitude tests for positions outside of labor. Id. 
at 427-28.  
 80. Id. at 429-30.  
 81. Id. at 432.  
 82. Id. at 428.  
 83. Id. at 431.  
 84. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 95-96 
(2000) (“[T]he opinion simultaneously retains and deploys the discourse of 
individualism associated with formal-race, as it insists that (1) individuals have 
merit and qualifications independent of their racial identity; and (2) distributive 
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insofar as arbitrary social and natural contingencies cannot impede employ-
ment prospects. 
“More than that,” the Griggs court added, “Congress has placed on the em-
ployer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.”85 After the plaintiff demonstrates 
a prima facie case of discrimination, the evidentiary burden shifts to the de-
fendant to show that the challenged employment practices constitute a business 
necessity. To demonstrate this business necessity, the defendant must rational-
ize the discriminatory practice, justifying why it is the sine qua non for the em-
ployment context. The burden necessitates objective proof through “meaning-
ful study” of the discriminatory practice’s relationship to job-performance 
ability.86 To hold otherwise would undermine the defendant’s burden by allow-
ing an employer’s subjective intentions to legitimate an adverse employment 
decision.87 Under the Court’s interpretation of business necessity, the employ-
er’s intentions are irrelevant because the doctrine requires demonstrable proof 
that the employment practices actually advance a race-neutral policy. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s confusing and inconsistent interpretation of the 
business necessity standard came to a head in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust.88 Justice O’Connor, writing for a nonbinding plurality, held that the 
Griggs “formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate 
burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the contrary, the ultimate 
burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been 
caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all 
times.”89 The opinion reduced the employer’s affirmative burden of persuasion, 
diluting the original business necessity standard in Griggs and collapsing it into 
disparate treatment analysis—which only requires a defendant to produce a 
nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision.90 The Watson 
interpretation of business necessity fails to recognize the fundamental difference 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment. Since disparate impact is not 
about intent, a mere nondiscriminatory justification “is simply not enough to 
legitimatize a practice that has the effect of excluding a protected class from job 
 85. 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).  
 86. Id. at 431.  
 87. In Griggs, the vice president of the company testified that the employment 
requirements in question would improve the overall quality of the workforce, id. 
at 431. But the Court rejected this testimony because the employees who did not 
pass the aptitude tests continued to perform satisfactorily, signaling that an 
employer’s intent is neither sufficient nor necessary for establishing a business 
necessity. See id. at 431-32.  
 88. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).  
 89. Id. at 997.  
 90. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).  
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opportunities at a significantly disproportionate rate.”91 If nondiscriminatory 
reasons were sufficient to escape disparate impact liability, then employment 
practices would continue to engender the effects of past discrimination. 
One year later, the conservative plurality in Watson earned a majority when 
Justice Kennedy joined the Court. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Justice 
White, clarifying and even relaxing the reasoning in Watson, wrote, “[T]he dis-
positive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the 
legitimate employment goals of the employer.”92 The challenged policy need 
not be “‘essential’” or “‘indispensable’” to the business necessity.93 This lan-
guage is contradictory, rendering business necessity a mere formality, rather 
than an affirmative burden for employers defending policies that have a dispar-
ate impact. Contrary to Griggs, this interpretation also obfuscates the need for a 
challenged employment criterion to bear a direct relationship to job perfor-
mance.94 
Beyond the doctrinal deconstruction, moreover, Wards Cove implicitly un-
dermines the social meaning of disparate impact when a demonstrable inequity, 
lacking sufficient justification, no longer leads to an inference of past injustice.95 
This is irreconcilable with Griggs’s theory of disparate impact as a legal remedy 
for the historical entrenchment of discriminatory practices in the labor market. 
Perhaps even more troubling, the Court’s analysis in its latest foray into dispar-
ate impact—albeit in the fair housing context—still cuts against Griggs’s social 
meaning. In Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
 91. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 92. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). In Wards Cove, the respondents, a diverse class of 
seasonal cannery workers in Alaska who lived in separate dormitories and ate in 
separate mess halls, alleged that their de facto segregation was a result of 
petitioners’ discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Under the business necessity standard, Griggs and its progeny espouse some level 
of empirical analysis to measure the relationship between the challenged 
employment practice and job performance. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (holding that height and weight requirements must be 
correlated to strength essential to job performance in order to constitute a 
business necessity); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) 
(“[D]iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally 
acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important 
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); cf. Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 335-43 
(D. Conn. 2011) (interpreting job relatedness and business necessity in the context 
of an employment practice requiring a physical fitness test).  
 95. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“One wonders 
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or, more accurately, 
race discrimination against nonwhites—is a problem in our society, or even 
remembers that it ever was.”). 
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Communities Project, Inc., Justice Kennedy quoted from the Wards Cove opin-
ion approvingly while disapproving of a racially conscious disparate impact 
framework.96 The Court, fearful of disparate impact liability leading to racial 
quotas in housing, instructed courts to “avoid interpreting disparate-impact li-
ability to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing 
decision.”97 With the addition of a defendant-friendly “robust causality re-
quirement” at the pleading stage—connecting the statistical showing to a dis-
criminatory housing policy—future claims will seemingly have to allege more 
than a disparate impact.98 Once again, the disparate impact framework appears 
to be slipping into a disparate treatment analysis, demanding more direct evi-
dence of discrimination, causation, and intent. Although the applicability of 
this reasoning to Title VII remains to be seen, Griggs’s theory of disparate im-
pact continues its decline into obscurity, ignoring discriminatory effects and the 
pretextual policies that entrench the racial imbalance. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding disparate impact’s meaning, Congress 
resurrected the business necessity defense in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, repu-
diating Wards Cove and explicitly affirming the Griggs standard.99 Title VII now 
clearly places the burden on the employer to show that “the challenged practice 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessi-
ty.”100 The problem is that the textual codification of business necessity implies 
indispensable or essential practices, whereas “consistent with business necessi-
ty” paradoxically diminishes the requisite criterion. Although business necessity 
has never been clear, the Griggs standard should be treated as an interpretive 
floor or baseline—consonant with Congress’s broad remedial objective under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, the “primary objective of Title VII is 
prophylactic: to achieve equal employment opportunity and to remove the bar-
riers that have operated to favor white male employees over other employ-
ees.”101 At the very least, then, an employer must show that a business necessity 
has a demonstrable relationship to job performance. Griggs and Title VII argua-
 96. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653) (“[A] disparate-
impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot 
point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity. A robust causality 
requirement ensures that ‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more, establish 
a prima facie case of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants from being 
held liable for racial disparities they did not create. . . . Without adequate 
safeguards at the prima facie stage, disparate-impact liability might cause race to 
be used and considered in a pervasive way and ‘would almost inexorably lead’ 
governmental or private entities to use ‘numerical quotas,’ and serious 
constitutional questions then could arise.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 97. Id. at 2524.  
 98. Id. at 2523-24. 
 99. See 137 CONG. REC. 28,680 (1991).  
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 101. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977).  
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bly require even more—both contemplate the tailoring of exclusionary policies 
through meaningful study to justify a business necessity. 
Courts should not dilute the business necessity standard beyond this base-
line. The Third Circuit’s opinion in El, for example, is contradictory insofar as 
it acknowledges that Griggs requires “some level of empirical proof that chal-
lenged hiring criteria accurately predicted job performance,” yet it goes on to 
say that Title VII does not “measure care in formulating hiring policies.”102 Em-
pirically based hiring policies appear, a fortiori, to require a degree of care. Ac-
cording to the Griggs Court, the challenged objective employment practice must 
not only “be related to job performance,” but it must also be “demonstrably a 
reasonable measure of job performance” and “must measure the person for the 
job and not the person in the abstract.”103 But, how does a court apply this 
standard in the context of criminal recidivism? Replace job performance, as 
broadly defined, with risk of criminal recidivism, broadly defined, and we reach 
the same determination that a challenged policy must demonstrate a reasonable 
measure of risk for a particular ex-offender. The El court defied this logic when 
it allowed SEPTA to escape liability without having measured risk as applied to 
specific applicants and their offenses. The Griggs baseline can be restored, how-
ever, by incorporating risk management into the business necessity defense. 
In light of the disparate impact framework, risk management does not re-
quire an insurmountable doctrinal extrapolation. Exclusionary hiring practices 
should be tailored to particular crimes and ex-offenders, accounting for obvious 
differences between violent and nonviolent crimes. The Third Circuit acknowl-
edged as much in El when it said “we deal with the risk that an applicant will 
endanger the employer’s patrons” and Title VII requires “that the policy under 
review accurately distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level 
of risk and those that do not.”104 The court goes on to say that “[i]f someone 
with a violent conviction presents a materially higher risk . . . then SEPTA is jus-
tified in not considering people with those convictions.”105 Fair enough, but 
such reasoning entails figuring out what constitutes “materially higher risk” and 
whether it relates to the employment and is consistent with business necessity. 
As a conceptual model, then, risk management lays the groundwork for a busi-
ness necessity standard that aligns with Griggs. Otherwise, an ill-defined stand-
ard could incentivize employers to craft deliberately vague policies, forcing ju-
dicial deference to practices that forsake the level of care and thought 
contemplated by Griggs.106 
 102. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971). 
 104. El, 479 F.3d at 244-45. 
 105. Id. at 245-46.  
 106. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1009-10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It would make no sense to 
establish a general rule whereby an employer could more easily establish business 
necessity for an employment practice, which left the assessment of a list of general 
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Curiously, this is precisely what happened in El. The court noted that “it is 
striking that not one of the witnesses that SEPTA named was able to explain—
beyond a general concern for passenger safety—why this particular policy was 
chosen from among myriad possibilities.”107 This vagueness is particularly trou-
bling because SEPTA arbitrarily distinguished certain crimes, promulgating a 
categorical ban for some offenses and a seven-year ban for others. SEPTA never 
revealed how exactly a black male with a forty-year-old homicide conviction 
posed an unacceptable risk that warranted a life ban. What if the crime were a 
forty-year old robbery conviction? Would that pose an unacceptable risk related 
to the job and consistent with business necessity? Ultimately, the court did not 
follow its own reasoning about rationally managing risk. But its hands may have 
been proverbially tied by the procedural disposition of the case. After the plain-
tiff failed to offer any evidence to rebut the business necessity, the court had lit-
tle choice but to find that a reasonable juror could believe SEPTA’s testimony 
about the unsubstantiated risk of recidivism.108 
Nevertheless, the concept of risk management as business necessity is also 
present other important cases involving criminal history discrimination and 
disparate impact. In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., the Eighth Circuit 
interpreted business necessity to mean that “[t]he system in question must not 
only foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal.”109 The im-
portance of workplace safety and efficiency imply that an exclusionary system 
must be not only accurately tailored to risk, but also job related. The defendant 
failed to ensure that the system was so related, instead proffering a number of 
vague reasons for excluding ex-convicts, including the fear of theft, the possibil-
ity of negligent hiring liability, and even a lack of individual morality.110 The 
Green court rebuked these justifications, noting that the company “has not em-
pirically validated its policy with respect to conviction records. . . .”111 Rational 
character qualities to the hirer’s discretion, than for a practice consisting of the 
evaluation of various objective criteria carefully tailored to measure relevant job 
qualifications.”). 
 107. El, 479 F.3d at 247-48.  
 108. Id. at 247 (“Had El produced evidence rebutting SEPTA’s experts, this would be a 
different case. Had he, for example, hired an expert who testified that there is time 
at which a former criminal is no longer any more likely to recidivate than the 
average person, then there would be a factual question for the jury to resolve.”).  
 109. 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 
464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972)). In Green, the appellant applied to be an office 
clerk for the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, which had a policy of 
categorically refusing to hire anyone with a criminal conviction. The challenged 
policy automatically barred 5.3% of the 3,282 black applicants, but only 2.23% of the 
5,206 white applicants. The court found this sufficient to establish prima facie 
evidence of a disparate impact.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. (emphasis added).  
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risk management, moreover, coheres with the three factors which have come to 
be known as the Green balancing test: (a) nature and seriousness of the offense; 
(b) the time passed since conviction; (c) and the nature of the job sought.112 
These factors move beyond a baseline risk of recidivism, requiring an exclu-
sionary policy to adjust to an individual’s specific risk. Notably, the Green fac-
tors were later officially adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and are entitled to Skidmore deference, meaning that the 
EEOC’s guidelines serve as a persuasive authority to courts depending on the 
cogency of the guidelines’ research and reasoning.113 This is, unfortunately, a 
somewhat self-defeating proposition since guidelines are just that—
guidelines—and generally do not entail rigorous scientific analysis. Regardless, 
Green stands for the idea that prior misconduct, “which may be remote in time 
or does not significantly bear upon the particular job requirements,” cannot 
and should not prevent meaningful opportunities for gainful employment.114 
Green empirically reasoned through individualized factors of risk and work-
place safety, thus bolstering the notion of business necessity as risk manage-
ment. 
 112. Id. at 1297 (quoting Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (S.D. Iowa 1974)); see 
also Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss a disparate impact claim because the 
plaintiffs’ prior offenses were both remote in time and insubstantial, and because 
both plaintiffs had demonstrated decades of good performance before mandatory 
background checks revealed their criminal histories). But see EEOC v. Carolina 
Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (criticizing Green and 
holding that the business necessity defense does not require proof that 
exclusionary policies are effective); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 
519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) (concluding convictions for theft and receipt of stolen 
goods were sufficiently job-related to justify refusing employment to a black 
applicant seeking work as a bellman), aff’d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 113. See U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15 (2006); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244 (1991) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). In 2012, 
the EEOC issued new enforcement guidelines. See U.S. EEOC, NOTICE 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964 (2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm. These new 
guidelines offer two safe harbors for employers seeking a business necessity 
defense. First, an employer can empirically validate a criminal records screening 
policy using the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Procedures under the 
parameters of 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2009). But even the EEOC admits that “social 
science studies that assess whether convictions are linked to future behaviors, 
traits, or conduct with workplace ramifications . . . are rare.” Id. at 15. Second, an 
employer can use a targeted screen, but must conduct an individualized 
assessment using the Green factors for any ex-offenders excluded by the initial 
targeted screen. For a discussion of these guidelines and their ramifications, see 
Nichols, supra note 33, at 608-10.  
 114. Green, 523 F.2d at 1298. 
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The disparate impact doctrine ultimately reveals that a sweeping disqualifi-
cation of job applicants based on criminal history, absent any business necessi-
ty, violates Title VII. In light of Griggs and its subsequent congressional appro-
bation, business necessity must be an affirmative burden, entailing the rational 
tailoring of a discriminatory practice to job performance. Risk management of-
fers a way to perform this tailoring in an objective and empirical way. The risk 
of recidivism, the amount of time passed since an arrest or conviction, the na-
ture of the underlying offense, and the type of job sought all inform how rele-
vant past unlawful behavior is to creating a safe employment environment. Ul-
timately, risk management’s compatibility with disparate impact doctrine 
allows for a proper burden-shifting evidentiary framework—a framework that 
coheres with the remedial objectives of Title VII. A criminal history should not 
impede equality of opportunity in employment unless justified by business ne-
cessity. 
 
B. Risk Management in Disability Rights Law 
 
Beyond Title VII disparate impact liability, risk management resonates in 
other areas of the antidiscrimination law canon. Disability rights law, in par-
ticular, further substantiates the notion of business necessity as risk manage-
ment. Although disability discrimination falls under the purview of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and not Title VII, the doctrinal framework is 
ostensibly similar. In the context of hiring, for example, the ADA prevents em-
ployers from finding out about an applicant’s disability prior to making a job 
offer—only when an offer is made may an employer ask questions related to an 
applicant’s disability. 115 If an applicant is “denied a job because these questions 
reveal a disability, then, as under Title VII, the employer must demonstrate that 
the exclusionary criteria are job-related and consistent with business necessi-
ty.”116 Since the ADA was modeled after Title VII, the doctrine closely tracks the 
disparate impact framework and, arguably, goes even further in its mandate of 
employer accommodation. 
In contemplating the risk of hiring a disabled worker, Congress codified in 
the ADA the “direct threat” doctrine, defined as “a significant risk to the health 
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, prac-
tices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”117 The doc-
trine was first laid out in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline118 and requires 
an employer to conduct “an individualized inquiry into the plaintiff’s unique 
abilities, to determine whether it would be unsafe to hire her.”119 The goal is to 
 115. Paul-Emile, supra note 8, at 936-37.  
 116. Id. at 937 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(4)(A), 12113(a) (2012)).  
 117. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(b), 12182(b)(3) (2012).  
 118. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).  
 119. Bagenstos, supra note 69, at 1490.  
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protect “handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereo-
types, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate 
concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety 
risks.”120 But the mere existence of a direct threat risk is not sufficient to avoid 
liability. An employer must also make a “reasonable accommodation” if it 
would substantially reduce a given risk.121 
The reasonable accommodation standard effectively tells employers what 
they can and cannot do and, more importantly, how they should do it—thus 
imposing a substantial obligation on businesses engaging in risk-based discrim-
ination.122 Since irrational perceptions of risk only reinforce the stigmatization 
and stereotyping that disability rights law seeks to ameliorate, accommodations 
must be based on objective, scientific evidence. The doctrine mandates a pro-
portionality approach in assessing the nature, duration, severity, and probabil-
ity of the risk materializing. The business receives little deference and must call 
upon expert opinions in the public health field to speak to the reasonableness of 
the employer’s actions.123 Here, the concept of risk management in disability 
law deviates from disparate impact doctrine insofar as a prevailing scientific 
consensus, rather than meaningful study, is needed to determine what consti-
tutes a significant risk. 
Admittedly, this scientific inquiry is much more difficult to do in the con-
text of criminal history. In the El case, for example, one of SEPTA’s expert crim-
inologists testified that however small the probability that someone with an old 
conviction and someone without a conviction will commit a future crime, 
“making such predictions of comparable low-probability events is extremely 
 120. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. 
 121. Id. at 287 nn.16 & 17.  
 122. In this sense, second-generation civil rights statutes like the ADA and Title VII 
effectively impart a regulatory burden on litigants. Although the statutes govern 
the adjudication of legal claims, the procedural mechanisms regulate how 
employers must conduct their business to obtain safe harbor from liability. 
Indeed, civil rights statutes have been upheld based on Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; EEOC v. Wyoming, 
460 U.S. 226 (1983) (extending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as 
applied to state and local governments as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause 
authority); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurants as a valid exercise of Commerce 
Clause authority); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) 
(upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to public 
accommodations as a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority). 
 123. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1998) (declaring that the petitioner, 
as a healthcare professional, must “assess the risk of infection based on the 
objective, scientific information available to him and others” and that “[i]n 
assessing the reasonableness of petitioner’s actions, the views of public health 
authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National 
Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority”).  
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difficult, and the criminological discipline provides no good basis for making 
such predictions with any assurance that they will be correct.”124 An assessment 
of risk through rates of recidivism in the context of criminal history may not be 
nearly as accurate as an assessment of risk through medical evidence in the con-
text of disability. But since the types of risks are effectively the same—threats to 
workplace safety—institutional decision makers (i.e., judges, juries, and even 
businesses) weighing a business necessity defense need information to decide 
what risks in a given situation are verifiably dangerous. Just as we would not 
want to allow a blind person to operate a forklift in a warehouse, we would not 
want to employ a convicted fraudster in an accounting office.125 The risk may 
simply be too high—but the doctrinal framework necessitates empirical con-
firmation. 
To be unequivocally clear, however, a traditional cost-benefit analysis can-
not, as a matter of law, underpin risk management. In both employment dis-
crimination and disability rights law, the doctrine espouses some empirical 
method of evaluating risk—within reasonable particularity—but it does not 
countenance a rigidly technocratic cost-benefit analysis. In defining a reasona-
ble accommodation, for example, Judge Richard Posner endorses the view that 
the law only requires a careful consideration of costs and benefits: 
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace 
to enable a disabled person to work would always have to be quanti-
fied, or even that an accommodation would have to be deemed unrea-
sonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the 
very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit. . . . So 
it seems that costs enter at two points in the analysis of claims to an ac-
commodation to a disability. The employee must show that the ac-
commodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of pro-
portional to the costs. Even if this prima facie showing is made, the 
employer has an opportunity to prove that upon more careful consid-
eration the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the 
accommodation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.126 
 124. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 246 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 125. See Field v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. Civ.A. 00-5913, 2001 WL 34368768, at *2-
3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001) (“It is, in short, the general policy of Title VII to require 
employers to make hiring and retention decisions on the basis of job-related 
factors. A blanket policy to refuse employment to persons with recent criminal 
records would not violate Title VII if the criminal conviction involved conduct 
which demonstrates a person’s lack of qualification for the job—e.g., a bank 
would not be required to hire, or retain in employment, a teller previously 
convicted of embezzlement.”). 
 126. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995). Indeed, 
Judge Posner would probably argue that if the benefits are truly greater than the 
costs in the marketplace, then no law would be necessary to enforce disability 
rights in the first place because the disabled would be hired. “Unfortunately, there 
are many obstacles to this happy story of self-correcting markets, not least because 
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For Judge Posner, generally weighing costs and benefits in broad strokes is 
far preferable to an interpretation of the ADA that would impose stringent cost-
benefit regulations on all compliant employers. But even the more substantive 
component of reasonableness, as Judge Posner points out, alludes to the duty of 
reasonable care in tort law, which, according to Judge Hand’s famous formula-
tion,127 explicitly considers the increased costs of care.128 Thus, the doctrine 
makes clear that costs and benefits should, at the very least, be positioned on 
different sides of the liability calculus. The doctrine then determines the pro-
portionality of these costs and benefits, arriving at a decision as to whether an 
employer should accommodate a given risk in the workplace. In short, the rea-
sonable accommodation standard legally mandates a procedure in which insti-
tutions must think carefully about risk. 
Similarly, Judge Guido Calabresi does not believe that “employers, in at-
tempting to meet their burden of persuasion on the reasonableness of the pro-
posed accommodation and in making out an affirmative defense of undue 
hardship, must analyze the costs and benefits of proposed accommodations 
with mathematical precision.”129 The reasonable accommodation standard en-
compasses sufficient leeway to make more of a “common-sense balancing of the 
costs and benefits.”130 Doctrinally, then, business necessity as risk management 
does not force courts to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, institutions 
must engage in the exercise of determining whether the benefits of hiring an ex-
offender are reasonably proportional to the costs.131 This notion of reasonable-
ness also implies a substantive component in the larger procedural framework 
of risk management. To the extent that the inquiry turns on the reasonableness 
of accommodating an ex-offender’s risk, factfinders can balance their own un-
derstanding of the risk with the value their community places on fair oppor-
tunity in the labor market. 
of prejudice on the part of employers, employees, and customers alike.” Sunstein, 
supra note 62, at 1907 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop 
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (1991)).  
 127. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)). 
 128. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.  
 129. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second 
Circuit does require some degree of an empirical analysis: “The burden on the 
employer, then, is to perform a cost/benefit analysis. In a sense, of course, that is 
what the plaintiff also had to do to meet her burden of making a prima facie case 
that reasonable accommodation existed. But while the plaintiff could meet her 
burden of production by identifying an accommodation that facially achieves a 
rough proportionality between costs and benefits, an employer seeking to meet its 
burden of persuasion on reasonable accommodation and undue hardship must 
undertake a more refined analysis.” Id.  
 130. Id. at 140.  
 131. See id. at 138 (“In short, an accommodation is reasonable only if its costs are not 
clearly disproportionate to the benefits it will produce.”).  
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Granted, this Note is not suggesting that the reasonable accommodation 
standard is incorporated into Title VII.132 For the purposes of risk management, 
the focus is less on substantive law and more on analytic process. This Note does 
suggest that the business necessity and the reasonable accommodation stand-
ards are analytically similar insofar as both objectively measure risk in deter-
mining whether an employer can safely and cost-effectively take on that risk in 
the workplace. Ultimately, if the ADA and Title VII frameworks are cognizant 
of risk management, then risk management serves to efficiently and equitably 
distribute risk in the labor market. Put another way, risk management attempts 
to provide an elusive reconciliation between the technocratic regulation of risk 
and the substantive equality embodied by civil rights law. 
According to Professor Linda Krieger, however, the ADA and its concomi-
tant legal doctrine “incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from 
that associated with traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”133 Krieger is right that the ADA, unlike Title VII, re-
quires an employer to engage “in a good faith interactive process” to find a rea-
sonable accommodation for a disabled worker.134 But Krieger also proves too 
much in her attempt to distinguish the substantive equality underlying the ADA 
from the supposedly formalistic equality underlying Title VII. In a similar vein, 
Professor Kimani Paul-Emile overstates her argument, arguing for a compre-
hensive overhaul of Title VII rather than drawing the already extant doctrinal 
connection between disparate impact liability and the disability rights frame-
work.135 The theory and practice of disparate impact are, logically, difficult to 
distinguish from the ADA’s reasonable accommodation standard. 
In theory, both countenance the status of a historically disadvantaged class, 
seeking a positive affirmation of a protected class member’s equal worth and 
dignity. To make this abstraction a reality, both doctrines, in practice, reform 
employment procedures in a nondiscriminatory way and, more importantly, 
challenge “the way in which the job is defined or structured in addition to the 
way in which candidates are selected for positions.”136 Granted, reasonable ac-
commodation does this in a very literal sense, challenging “the elements of the 
job itself as currently configured.”137 Liability under the ADA, for example, may 
require an employer to affirmatively aid a disabled employee by building a 
 132. The reasonable accommodation standard does apply to religion under Title VII. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 133. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 3 (2000). 
 134. Id. at 4.  
 135. Paul-Emile, supra note 8, at 935.  
 136. Jolls, supra note 1, at 669.  
 137. Id. (quoting Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, 
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 n.34 (1996)).  
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wheelchair ramp. Disparate impact obviously operates in different contexts. 
But, as Professor Christine Jolls convincingly argues, disparate impact and ac-
commodation are in fact equivalent.138 For one, “disparate impact liability re-
quires employers to incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs 
(measured against existing market structures) of a particular group of employ-
ees.”139 Jolls traces how disparate impact substantively overlaps with accommo-
dation in terms of employment grooming rules, language requirements, selec-
tion procedures, and pregnancy leave.140 
It is difficult to see how striking down a no-beard rule or a hiring policy 
that categorically excludes ex-offenders does not, in fact, change a job in a ma-
terial sense. Both get rid of a functional inequity as it relates to a discriminatory 
effect, as does a reasonable accommodation. Any distinction between disparate 
impact and reasonable accommodation does not withstand critical scrutiny and 
proves to be “an untenable mechanism for limiting the scope of disparate im-
pact liability, as well as a restriction that lacks support in existing doctrine.”141 
Acknowledging this crucial fact allows us to see that both disparate impact and 
reasonable accommodation work against structural subordination—expressly 
regulating the provision of job functionings to better achieve equal opportunity. 
This places disparate impact well within an operative, albeit controversial, norm 
of employment discrimination law—forcing an employer to bear the burden of 
providing fair opportunity through accommodation. 
Ultimately, business necessity as risk management coheres with a doctrinal 
understanding of the ADA’s right to a reasonable accommodation in the work-
place. Employment decisions must account for an objective, scientific assess-
ment of the risk associated with hiring someone with a disability. This defensive 
burden, in turn, substantiates the Griggs threshold for business necessity, re-
quiring a discriminatory practice to be rationally tailored and job related. How-
ever, risk management’s mere doctrinal compatibility with antidiscrimination 
law may not be enough to enforce the civil rights of a discrete and insular mi-
nority. The efficacy of the ADA, like that of disparate impact, remains doubtful. 
In the late 1990s, defendants prevailed in approximately 92.7% of ADA Title I 
cases.142 Professor Krieger generalizes that the practical failures of the ADA can 
be attributed to the problem of “the role of law in effecting social change” and 
whether “formal legal rules and constructs on the one hand” can conform to 
 138. Id. at 645 (“[A]ntidiscrimination law fairly obviously operates to require 
employers to incur undeniable financial costs associated with employing the 
disfavored group of employees—and thus in a real sense to ‘accommodate’ these 
employees.”). 
 139. Id. at 655.  
 140. Id. at 653-65.  
 141. Id. at 670.  
 142. Krieger, supra note 133, at 8.  
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“informal social norms and institutions on the other.”143 Indeed, as long as po-
litical communities remain skeptical of this more affirmative civil rights para-
digm, judges may narrowly or reductively interpret antidiscrimination law. The 
efficacy of disparate impact liability is similarly impeded when social norms on 
the ground do not accord with the doctrine’s cultural understanding of histori-
cal discrimination. As a normative matter, then, the business necessity doctrine 




Risk management can be more than just a slogan in today’s data-driven 
world. By distinguishing between a cost-effective business necessity and mere 
pretext for discrimination, risk management can be an analytic construct that 
restores Title VII to its proper scope. Although weary of seemingly limitless lia-
bility and so-called reverse discrimination, courts, which have long have sought 
to narrow disparate impact, must face the natural import of Title VII. The stat-
ute logically authorizes accommodation, effectively operating in a regulatory 
capacity to remedy structural, adverse effects in the marketplace. Risk manage-
ment, however, might plausibly be a rational, limiting principle derived from 
the doctrine. 
On one hand, employers must tailor a discriminatory hiring practice to a 
job-related risk, making sure to proportionally weigh the costs and benefits of 
accommodating that risk. Recidivism rates, the amount of time since an arrest 
or conviction, the nature of the underlying offense, and the type of job sought 
inform this calculus. The normative dimension, on the other hand, allows the 
factfinder to make value judgments, weighing expressive considerations of risk 
and equity. My hope is that risk management will move us closer to reconciling 
an affirmative civil rights paradigm with the realities of managing risk in the 
workplace. The resulting synthesis might allow us to reduce the stigma of a 
criminal record and, in turn, realize equality of opportunity in the labor mar-
ket. 
 143. Id. at 18.  
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